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This paper reverses the standard order between input supply negotiations and 
downstream competition and assumes that competition for orders takes place 
prior to procurement of inputs in a vertical chain. In an environment where 
procurement negotiations involve no restrictions on the form of pricing, it is 
found that oligopolistically competitive outcomes will result despite the presence 
of an upstream monopolist. In this environment, vertical integration is a means 
by which the monopolist can leverage its market power downstream to the 
detriment of consumers. However, it does so, not by foreclosing on independent 
downstream firms, but by softening the competitive behaviour of its own 
integrated units. Thus, the paper provides a simple rationale for anti-competitive 
vertical integration in an environment that otherwise respects the usual Chicago 
school assumptions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: L42 
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Standard economic treatments of vertical contracting assume that upstream and 
downstream firms agree to supply contracts between them prior to downstream firms 
engaging in competition for final consumers. In this respect, the terms in supply contracts 
form a commitment in that firms in downstream markets can take those terms as given 
and those terms can shape the nature of competition between them. One of the key 
insights from this type of model has been that an upstream firm with monopoly power 
can use contractual commitments to leverage that power downstream. An upstream 
monopolist, say, by the use of non-linear contracts, can ensure that downstream prices – 
even allowing for downstream competition – end up at their monopoly level. In so doing, 
such contracts obviate the further need for vertical integration or exclusive dealing as 
actions to generate monopoly outcomes. This insight has given rise to the Chicago School 
view of antitrust where those actions are seen as innocuous at worst and at best legitimate 
as they can generate productive efficiencies (e.g., Bork, 1978). 
However, the notion that underlies these models – that procurement agreements 
are fixed prior to downstream competition – is not necessarily applicable for all 
industries. Indeed, there exist some industries where, in reality, firms compete and secure 
customer orders before negotiating contracts to procure inputs to fill those orders. One of 
the clearest recent examples is the supply chain management practices of Dell. Faced 
with concern about being stuck with obsolete inventory in an industry with rapid 
technological change, Dell adopted an alternative strategy based around the principle: 
“Order from suppliers only when you receive demand from customers.” (Magretta, 1998, 
p.74) Dell practices this with all of its suppliers, some of whom (e.g., Intel) have 
substantial market power. Moreover, this is achieved without locked-in agreement as to 
pricing terms. 
Similar practices are not uncommon; occurring in industries with more or less 
upstream competition. Consider the following:  
•  Building and architectural contracts where input requirements are 
generally unknown prior to receiving a customer order.    2
•  The provision of large scale services to government or firms (in defense or 
information technology) involves competition for contracts that precede 
procurement decisions regarding capital equipment supplies and human 
capital expertise in on-going legal and consulting services (Kamien, Li 
and Samet, 1989).  
•  If customer switching costs are substantial, competition for those 
customers takes place at a time well in advance of when consumption of 
the requisite services will be required.  
•  Electricity and gas retailing where customers (both residential and 
industrial) are sold forward contracts before supply agreements to obtain 
the necessary stock or supplies are set (Stahl, 1988). 
More generally, it is quite conceivable that procurement contracts may be subject to hold-
up and ex post renegotiation once customer contracts are in place. In this situation, 
common to analyses of vertical relationships in the incomplete contracts literature (Hart, 
1995), modeling procurement negotiations as occurring following the marketing of 
services to customers would be necessary to fully capture the lack of commitment power 
inherent in some supply agreements.  
The purpose here is not to explore the drivers of contract timing but focus on its 
implications. To do this, I adopt a simple change to the standard vertical contracting 
model: instead of input supply terms being fixed prior to downstream competition, I 
assume that the reverse occurs. That is, downstream firms first compete for orders 
(resolving their price and quantity in an oligopolistic equilibrium). Then those firms 
approach the upstream monopolist to negotiate over input procurement. This captures the 
notion that downstream firms may be more easily able to commit to contracts with 
customers than be locked in to input supply contracts. 
It is demonstrated that this modeling change, while straightforward, has important 
and surprising implications for the level of competition in downstream markets.
1 
Specifically, even in an environment of contractual flexibility regarding the nature of ex 
post procurement, oligopolistically competitive outcomes result in the industry. In 
                                                 
1 Indeed, McAfee and Schwartz (1994, p.220) conjectured that if sales were determined prior to input 
negotiations, a simple oligopolistically competitive outcome would not emerge. It is demonstrated here that 
this is not the case and a Cournot outcome is an equilibrium outcome.   3
contrast, for the same contractual space, the standard approach would yield a monopoly 
outcome with the upstream supply able to commit to input supply terms that maximise 
industry profit (i.e., the Chicago school conclusion). 
The intuition behind the result here is simple. Downstream firms anticipate supply 
negotiations when they compete ex ante. If those ex post negotiations are efficient (i.e., 
they maximise bilateral surplus), so long as the order price exceeds the marginal cost of 
the input requirements for that order, procurement will take place. Moreover, as an 
efficient surplus is shared by the downstream firm, that firm internalises the efficient 
upstream supply choice when competing for orders with other downstream firms. The 
result is an oligopolistically competitive outcome with upstream supply taking place in a 
productively efficient manner. 
The existence of competitive outcomes generates scope for vertical integration to 
raise industry profits. It is demonstrated that vertical integration can achieve an increase 
in industry profits by softening downstream competition. However, it does this, not by 
foreclosing on non-integrated downstream firms (as is the usual anti-trust concern), but 
instead  by providing incentives for integrated units to weaken their own competitive 
choices.
2 That is, vertical integration results in a contraction in internal supply and an 
expansion in external supply. So while integration under standard vertical contracting can 
generate a situation where “rival’s costs rise” to the detriment of competition, here rivals’ 
competitive advantages are stimulated. Nonetheless, by virtue of its monopoly position, 
the upstream firm appropriates part of the increase in industry rents that occurs. This is a 
novel mechanism for anti-competitive vertical integration and, all the more significant in 
that it does not arise from problems associated with contractual externalities or 
restrictions on the form of input prices.  
It is useful to contrast these results with a recent literature designed to counter the 
Chicago school approach. That literature has suggested that the very commitment power 
of contracts could give rise to ex post opportunism. For example, Hart and Tirole (1990), 
O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Segal (1999) analyse the 
                                                 
2 This stands in contrast to the post-Chicago approach to vertical mergers that focuses on the way a vertical 
integrated firm can commit to ‘raise rival’s costs.’ (see Riordan and Salop, 1995). In general, this is done 
by committing to higher input prices to independent downstream firms than is implicit within the integrated 
firm (see Ordover, Saloner and Salop, 1990; Chen, 2001; Rey and Tirole, 2005; de Fontenay and Gans, 
2005).   4
outcomes that emerge when supply negotiations between any one downstream firm and 
the upstream monopolist are not observed by other downstream firms. In this situation, 
each downstream firm is concerned that, having committed to a supply contract 
consistent with monopoly outcomes, the monopolist may engage in opportunistic ‘secret 
discounting’ to other downstream firms; leaving those without such discounts at a loss-
inducing competitive disadvantage. Consequently, the only contracts they will sign are 
those consistent with oligopolistic outcomes (i.e., discounts offered to all) where the 
monopolist does not have an incentive to engage in opportunistic behaviour.
3 Here, by 
engaging in vertical integration or exclusive dealing, the monopolist can commit not to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour and thereby restore monopoly outcomes as they might 
emerge in a complete contracting environment. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Next, several papers, where 
competition for orders precedes procurement in vertical contracting, are identified and 
their relationship to the present paper explored. In Section 2, vertical contracting when 
the upstream monopolist is not integrated downstream is examined and the main result 
that oligopolistically competitive outcomes result despite the presence of a monopoly 
bottleneck. Section 3 then considers the effect, profitability and welfare effects from 
vertical integration in this context. Section 4 extends the baseline model to the case of 
Bertrand price competition downstream and to consider exclusive dealing. A final section 
concludes. 
Related Literature  
There are a handful of antecedents to this paper in the literature; modeling 
competition for orders prior to procurement negotiations. Stahl (1988) examines a model 
of price setting downstream firms who procure inputs from a competitive set of upstream 
suppliers. In one variant of his model, it is assumed that competition downstream is for 
forward contracts and bidding for inputs takes place later. He demonstrates that this leads 
to (Walrasian) competitive outcomes across the entire vertical chain. As will be 
demonstrated below (Section 4), his model is distinct in that a single input price is set 
                                                 
3 In this setting, depending upon the contract space, different types of oligopolistic outcomes can emerge 
(see Rey and Tirole, 2005).   5
(there is no price discrimination in the wholesale market) and downstream firms 
otherwise have all the power in that market. In contrast, the model here presumes that the 
single upstream firm bargains one-on-one with each downstream firm, giving it some 
bargaining power and also permitting discriminatory input pricing outcomes. 
Consequently, in this setting the Walrasian outcomes derived by Stahl do not hold. 
Moreover, Stahl does not analyse how vertical restrictions impact on downstream market 
outcomes. 
Kamien, Li and Samet (1989) also consider an environment where bidding for 
customer (in their case a single customer contract) precedes procurement. Their model 
focuses on a situation where firms are vertically integrated but that, for efficiency 
reasons, if one firm wins a contract it may want to subcontract part of the contract with 
the losing firm. They demonstrate that the distribution of bargaining power impacts on 
the competitiveness of bid competition ex ante. Specifically, if the losing firm has lots of 
bargaining power ex post, this weakens ex ante price competition. Similarly, below it is 
demonstrated that strong upstream bargaining power (under vertical separation) weakens 
ex ante price competition. The strength of the contribution here relates to its comparison 
with the standard vertical contracting literature and its focus on how changes in vertical 
structure impact on downstream competition. Neither of the earlier papers examine these 
issues.
4
2. Vertical  Contracting 
This section provides the baseline result of the paper that when competition for 
orders precedes procurement negotiations, oligopolistically competitive outcomes 
(namely, Cournot competition) result. 
                                                 
4 Rey and Tirole (2005) look at a “make to order” specification whereby input pricing terms are agreed 
upon ex ante but actual input supply quantities are determined following downstream competition. The key 
feature of the approach here is to assume that no supply commitments (in either price or quantity) are made 
prior to downstream competition for orders.   6
Notation 
Let   denote an individual downstream firm. Firm i has inverse 
demand curve,  , which is a function of it own output, x
{1,..., } i ∈ N
( , ) ii i Pxx − i, and a vector of the 
output of others, x-i. It is assumed that   is non-increasing in each of its arguments, for 






i xx x x
∂∂
∂∂ ∂ <  for all i and  ji ≠ .
5 Downstream firms face no other costs, save 
for the costs of procuring inputs,  ii p x . In order to sell  i x  units of output, firm i requires 
 units of the input.  i yx = i
Initially, it is supposed there is a single provider of inputs to all downstream firms 
(U). U has costs described by a non-decreasing function,  . Denote   
as the marginal cost of supplying an additional unit to i. We assume that   is 
increasing in x
1 (, . . . ) N Cx x 1 ( ,... ) iN Cx x
1 ( ,... ) iN Cx x
i for xi > 0. Sometimes it is convenient to refer to   and  ( , ) ii Cxx − ( , ) ii i Cxx −  
in order to focus attention in variations in xi holding x-i as given. It is assumed that, 
.  (0,0) (0,...,0) ii PC >
Timeline 
STAGE 1: Each downstream firm competes for orders in the downstream market. 
An order is a pair ( , comprising an average price, P , ) ii Px i, over a fixed 
quantity of orders, xi. Competition involves downstream firms 
choosing xi taking the order quantity of other firms ( i x− ) as given with 
their aggregate quantity determining equilibrium contract price (a la 
Cournot). 
 
STAGE 2: Taking their orders,  , as given, each downstream firm who 
wishes to procure a positive quantity negotiates with U over the price 
paid per unit of input required 
( , ) ii Px
( , ) ii p y . These negotiations are 
bilateral; the outcome of which is described in detail below. 
 
STAGE 3: Downstream firms who reach an agreement with U produce. Those 
who do not reach an agreement with U for all of their orders incur 
default costs.  
 
                                                 
5 These assumptions are made to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an interior Cournot equilibrium 
(Vives, 1999).   7
STAGE 4: Payments are made and payoffs are realised. 
The Cournot case – where downstream firms choose the order quantities they would like 
to achieve and the market price adjusts accordingly (as assumed for Stage 1) – is the 
focus of the paper. However, in Section 4, it will be demonstrated that all of the main 
results of the paper carry over to the Bertrand case.  
Working backwards, in Stage 3, I will make two important assumptions: 
(A1) There is an exogenous default cost, d > 0, per unit of orders unfulfilled.  
 
(A2) If no supply agreement was reached in Stage 2, no default payments are 
made. 
 
The first assumption simplifies the analysis considerably and, as will be demonstrated, it 
does not play a critical role. The second assumption is an assumption that, to some extent, 
a downstream firm is judgment proof. That is, in the absence of (A2), if a supply 
agreement is not reached, the downstream firm would earn negative profits should they 
have to pay damages. However, here I assume that this cannot occur and the firm will not 
be able to pay those damages. (A2) simplifies the analysis considerably. If it were not 
present this would have an impact on the strength of downstream competition but 
otherwise the results in this paper would be unchanged.
6
In Stage 2, bargaining takes place bilaterally. I rely here on the model of 
simultaneous Nash bargaining employed by Horn and Wolinsky (1988). There, U 
engages in Nash bargaining with all N downstream firms simultaneously. Given (A1) and 
(A2), the outcome of this is the solution to N problems of the form: 
  () ( ) ( )
1
(,) 1 max min[ , ] max[ ,0]) ( , ) (0, )
ii
N
yp i i i i i i i j j i i j j i jj i Py x p y dx y p y C y y p y C y
λ
λ −
−− =≠ −− − − − − ∑∑ (1) 
where λ is a measure of U’s bargaining power in each negotiation.
7
                                                 
6 Specifically, there would now be an additional cost to accepting customer orders that would diminish the 
negotiated payments to downstream firms. This would soften competition between them somewhat. 
7 There are numerous ways this type of bargaining might be implemented by a non-cooperative game. For 
instance, suppose that with probability λ, U has an opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each 
downstream firm simultaneously while with probability 1-λ, U receives a take-it-or-leave-it offer from all 
downstream firms. Having received an offer (or set of offers), a player chooses whether to accept that offer, 
in which case it forms a binding contract or reject it, in which case no trade occurs between those players. It 
is straightforward to demonstrate that in any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, each firm obtains 
the same expected payoff as they receive from the Horn-Wolinsky approach.   8
It is worth emphasising at this point that it is assumed here that  [0,1) λ ∈ . This is 
in contrast to the common assumption in the vertical contracting literature that U can 
make take-it-or-leave-it offers to downstream firms (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Segal, 
1999). When orders precede procurement, this assumption cannot be meaningfully 
applied as downstream firms would receive no profits regardless of what they did to 
compete for orders. While this will not change the oligopolistically competitive outcome 
below from being an equilibrium, any outcome possible in equilibrium.
8 As such, it is 
assumed throughout that U’s bargaining power (λ) is bounded away from 1 although on 
occasion I look at the outcomes of the limiting case as λ approaches 1. 
There is one important restriction on the contracting space that is implicit in the 
specification of the bargaining game above. An offer from U or a downstream firm is 
simply a price and quantity pair that does not change regardless of the outcomes of other 
negotiations. Thus, agreements cannot be made contingent upon the outcome of later 
negotiations. 
Bargaining Outcome 
Take a set of orders {} 1 ,
N
ii i Px
= . Then: 
Proposition 1. If (i)  (, ) ii i PdC x x i − +≥  for all i, and (ii)  (, ) ii i i iPx C x x− ≥ ∑ , then  ii yx =  
and  () ( 1)( ,) ( 0 ,) ii ii i i i p xP x C x xC x λλ − =+ − − −
                                                
, for all i. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. It will turn out that, in the equilibrium of the full game, 
condition (i) is always met; guaranteeing that all orders are filled. With this, the 
proposition states that the solution to any bilateral negotiation is the same as the Nash 
bargaining outcome.
9 This requires condition (ii) that, if all orders are filled, industry 
 
8 It should be noted here that in the standard literature with private information, many equilibrium 
outcomes are possible. The case that is the focus of most attention in that literature is the one that yields a 
Cournot outcome (see Rey and Tirole, 2005). However, that case requires an assumption of passive beliefs 
(something that may not be reasonable in many circumstances). Indeed, it is also possible that the 
integrated monopoly outcome could arise under alternative belief assumptions (McAfee and Schwartz, 
1994). The advantage in this paper is that with  [0,1) λ ∈ , the equilibrium outcome is unique and is the 
appealing Cournot case. 
9 Note that there is no issue here of the form of upstream pricing. Essentially negotiations are over what 
proportion of the order to fulfill and the payment for that. The payment can take a per unit form (as has   9
profits are positive. Notice that it is conceivable that this might not be the case even if 
condition (i) is satisfied. For instance, if C(.) is not weakly convex (e.g., U has sizeable 
fixed costs). 
Ex Ante Competition for Orders 
In Stage 1, each i chooses  i x  to maximise:  ( , ) E[ ( , ) ] ii ii ii ii P x xx p x xx −− −  where the 
expected procurement costs are as in Proposition 1. Let  1 ˆ {}
N
ii x =  be the set of equilibrium 
orders. This results in the following (all proofs are in the appendix): 
Proposition 2. In any subgame perfect equilibrium, if  1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( ,..., ) ii ii N iPxx x Cx x − ≥ ∑ , then 
1 ˆ {}
N
ii x =  satisfies: 
ˆˆ argmax ( , ) ( , )
i ix i i i i i ˆ i x Pxx x Cxx −− ∈−  for all i. 
 
Thus, the outcome is a Cournot oligopoly outcome where upstream supply is efficiently 
provided. This mirrors results in the vertical contracting literature where procurement 
precedes orders.
10 Here, however, observationally, upstream prices may be linear and not 
involve lump sum payments. Despite this, for a given order, procurement is efficient and 
does not involve the negative consequences of double marginalisation that would 
normally arise when upstream prices are linear and downstream competition is imperfect. 
In the standard vertical contracting case (where procurement precedes orders), as 
products become differentiated and/or relative bargaining power changes, it is not 
possible to provide a characterisation of the outcome of the precise form that has been 
done in Proposition 2; it is likely to depend on both of these parameters. Where orders 
precede procurement, however, the Cournot outcome occurs regardless of the allocation 
of bargaining power or the nature of downstream products and upstream technology. 
While the characterisation is both sharp and robust, it does, however, rely on the 
identification of the nature of downstream competition.
11
Next I will explore the impact of pre-emptive vertical integration on this outcome. 
It is useful to note that other pre-emptive actions on the part of the upstream monopolist 
                                                                                                                                                 
been done here) or a non-linear schedule. Essentially, however, it is the lump sum that matters and the form 
of the price is simply made for notational convenience. 
10 See Hart and Tirole (1990) and Segal (1999). de Fontenay and Gans (2005) provide a general treatment. 
11 Other models of vertical contracting rely on this too. Generally, downstream competition is assumed to 
be Bertrand with the outcomes driven by the types of input pricing contracts that are feasible.   10
could impact on the rents achieved. For instance, U might be able to make a capacity 
commitment ex ante. If this were a costless action, U could commit to a capacity that led 
to maximal industry profits. However, if capacity were costly, then for  1 λ < , U only 
appropriates a fraction of industry returns and so may set capacity below the level a fully 
integrated monopolist might choose. 
4. Vertical  Integration 
The key feature of the results derived thus far is the fact that oligopolistically 
competitive outcomes emerge despite the presence of an upstream monopolist. 
Competition emerges because there is no mechanism by which the monopolist can 
commit to input pricing outcomes that impact on downstream competition. A lack of 
commitment also drives the emergence of competitive outcomes in the standard vertical 
contracting literature. There, however, an upstream monopolist cannot commit not to 
engage in ‘secret discounting’ in an environment where there is imperfect information. In 
that environment, vertical integration, however, provides a means by which the 
monopolist can achieve commitments to softer downstream competition in the absence of 
feasible contractual mechanisms. That possibility is examined for the alternative 
environment here. 
Suppose that U purchases one or more downstream firms. In this situation, the 
integrated units will be able to base their orders directly on the U’s marginal cost. 
However, as in Chen (2001), integrated units will also have regard to the potential profits 
U might earn from non-integrated firms. 
Nonetheless, it is first useful to note that for a given set of orders, the bargaining 
outcomes between U and any individual downstream will be as in Proposition 1. This is 
because, in each bilateral negotiation, joint surplus depends only upon the value of the 
order and the impact on upstream costs. It does not depend upon the terms achieved by 
other independent firms or U’s own downstream divisions.  
Let  ˆ () i x I  and  ˆ () i p I  be the equilibrium order and price of an independent i when 
I firms are integrated and let   be those for an integrated unit. It is easy to see that  ˆ () j zI  11
* ˆ () i zN x = i ; that is,  if all downstream firms are integrated, a monopoly outcome is 
possible; so complete integration will be (weakly) preferred by all firms relative to non-
integration or partial integration. What is more interesting are the comparative static 
results regarding the effect of partial integration. 
Proposition 3. Suppose that each i is symmetric and IN < . In any subgame perfect 
equilibrium, if  ˆ E[ ] 0 ii j px z ∂∂ <  (for all i and j) then, (i)  ˆ ˆ () ( 0 ) jj zI x < , (ii)  ˆˆ (0) ( ) ii x xI < , 
(iii) 
ˆ () 1




i N Iz I N I x I +− < ; and (iv)  . A necessary condition for 
(i) to (iv) not to hold is that 
ˆ ˆ (0) ( ) ( ) ( ) ii i Nx Iz I N I x I >+ − ˆ




The proposition demonstrates that if the revenues U expects to receive from independent 
downstream firms falls as integrated output expands then industry output and hence, 
consumer surplus will be lower as a result of integration. Moreover, this occurs because 
U has an incentive to contract the output of its integrated units relative to what they 
would sell if they were not integrated. This, in turn, leads to an expansion in independent 
sales and an increase in their market share. Thus, the anti-competitive effect of 
integration here is not foreclosure (a reduction in independent output) but precisely the 
opposite. Indeed, independent firms benefit from integration. 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 can be illustrated by focusing on the Cournot 
case with symmetric downstream firms selling a homogenous product. In this situation, 
independents still solve: 
ˆˆ ˆˆ () a r g m a x ( ( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) ) x x I P Iz N I x x x C Iz N I x x ∈ +− −+ − +− −+  
while an integrated firm solves: 
Integrated unit revenues Payments from independents
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) argmax ( ( ) ) ( )E[ ( ) ] ( ( ) ) z zI PI z N IxI z N I pI zx CI z N Ix ∈+ − + − − +  	    
   	   
 ˆ −  
where  ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ( )) ( 1 ) ( ( )) ( ( 1 )) p Iz x P Iz N I x x C Iz N I x C Iz N I x λλ =+ − + − + − − + − − . 
Integration means that when considering their sales level, integrated units take into 
account their impact on (a) the revenues received externally from independent units; and 
(b) the revenues achieved internally by other integrated units. The first effect may be 
positive or negative and, as it plays a critical role in Proposition 3, it is examined in detail 
next. On the other hand, the second effect is the same as would occur if downstream 
firms were to merge and, ceteris paribus, implies that integrated firms will contract output   12
relative to when they were not integrated. It is for this reason that a sufficient condition 
for an overall reduction in integrated firm and overall output is that integrated sales 
reduce  U’s external revenue and that an output expansion necessarily has a positive 
external revenue impact. 
When I = 1, the external revenue impact drives the outcomes entirely (as there is 
no internal revenue impact). In this situation, what is the impact of integrated sales on 
external revenue? Note that: 
  N ()
Increased Competition
Improved Bargaining Position
ˆˆ E[ ( ) ] ˆˆ (1 ) ( ( 1) ) ( ( 2) )
pzx
P x Cz N x Cz N x
z
λλ






There are two effects here. First, if an increase in sales by integrated units raises the 
incremental cost of supplying a given independent unit, this improves U’s relative 
bargaining position. If supply to independents is less attractive at the margin this raises 
the price extracted from them. Second, an increase in integrated sales reduces the 
downstream price. This reduction is shared by the independent firm and U, reducing U’s 
external revenues.  
These two effects – a bargaining effect and a competition effect – (potentially) 
have opposing impacts on the incentives of an integrated firm to increase its sales 
downstream. Indeed, if the competition effect outweighs the bargaining effect, that 
incentive is reduced; integrated units will generate fewer orders, in equilibrium, than their 
independent downstream rivals. In the end, overall downstream quantity is reduced 
following integration, lowering consumer surplus. On the other hand, a relatively strong 
bargaining effect may turn integration into what Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) termed a 
‘top dog’ strategy. Ceteris paribus, this effect causes the integrated firm to be more 
aggressive downstream, raising internal supply at the expense of external supply. While 
this harms independent downstream firm, it benefits consumers as total quantity 
increases. 
When will one effect dominate? Re-arranging (2), and assuming that  :  ˆ 0 x >
 
ˆˆ (( 1 ) ) (( 2 ) )
ˆ 1( . )
ˆˆ (( 1 ) ) (( 2 ) )
ˆ (( 2 ) )
ˆˆ E[ ( ) ]
() 0 ()
                         ( )
Cz N x Cz N x
Px







′′ +− − +−
′ −






 (3)   13
Thus, the competition effect dominates the bargaining effect when (i) incremental 
upstream costs are increasingly convex and (ii) U’s bargaining power is high. Note that 
when upstream costs exhibit increasing returns or have a constant marginal cost, external 
revenues necessarily fall as the integrated firm generates more downstream orders. As 
such, increased integrated sales make it more desirable to reach independent deals at the 
margin (improving an independent’s bargaining position). In contrast, when upstream 
costs are convex, it is increasingly costly for U to serve another independent unit when it 
has a high level of internal supply. This commits it to a higher price from those 
independent sales. 
In terms of bargaining power (λ), note that when λ is close to 1, an integrated firm 
places most weight on the downstream value from independent sales (that is the 
downstream price received). As such, it internalises this competitive externality when 
choosing sales quantity from its own division; reducing its own sales in order to soften 
downstream competition. Interestingly, in equilibrium, this will mean that independent 
firms will generate higher orders and profits relative to the situation where U was not 
integrated. 
The relative salience of the competition and bargaining effects can be easily seen 
in a specific example. Suppose that  2 N = ,  1 I = ,   and 
 with 
1 Pz =−− x
)








−− +− − =  and  2
(1 )(1 2 )(1 )




− −+ −− = . 
Notice that when  0 β =  (costs are linear), then 
(1 )(1 ) 1




− => = λ −  and as λ goes to 1, 
partial integration achieves the integrated monopoly outcome. This is achieved by U 
completely foreclosing on its internal division ( ˆ 0 z = ). Note also that 
(2 )(1 ) 2(1 )





α , the non-integrated outcome (with equality at λ = 0).  





β λ + >≤  (4) 
The right hand side of (4) is increasing in β (a measure of the convexity of upstream 
costs). (4) is a necessary and sufficient condition for  ˆ ˆ () x z >≤  and 
2(1 )




+ +> ≤ , the   14
non-integrated outcome. Note, however, that at λ = 1, integration always results in a 
reduction in industry output.  
In summary, when competition for orders precedes negotiations over 
procurement, there is a novel mechanism for anti-competitive vertical integration. 
Depending upon the nature of upstream costs, so long as U’s bargaining power is 
sufficiently high, it will contract its internal supply (perhaps completely) in order to 
mitigate negative effects from intense competition downstream. In contrast, in traditional 
models of vertical contracting, integration results in an expanded market share for 
integrated firms at the expense of independent ones (potentially foreclosing on them). 
This is because the competitive externality in those models is taken into account in 
bargaining with independent firms while integrated firms are supplied only on the basis 
of their own downstream revenues.
12 In effect, reversing the timing of procurement and 
competition for orders switches the supply agreements (external and internal) competitive 
externalities are internalised.  
Equilibrium Integration 
While the preceding analysis has examined the consequences of vertical 
integration, there is a question over the level of vertical integration U might choose. To 
be sure, as complete integration achieves the industry monopoly outcome, there appear to 
be gains to trade from all downstream firms being acquired by U. So, at first blush, one 
might be tempted to conclude that a similar logic might apply to integration of a single 
firm. However, as already noted, if upstream costs are convex and U’s bargaining power 
is sufficiently low, industry profits fall as a result of partial integration. For such 
integration to be profitable U’s improved bargaining position would have to outweigh 
any loss as a result of higher competition downstream, even before taking into account 
any acquisition costs for downstream firms. 
To see these issues more clearly it is worthwhile returning to the simple 2 firm 
example used above. Note first that when β = 0 (so upstream costs are linear), the profits 
of an integrated U and an independent downstream firm are: 
                                                 
12 See Hart and Tirole (1990) and also de Fontenay and Gans (2002) for the case where downstream 
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Notice that:  (1) (0) UU π π >  and  (1) (0) ii π π ≥  with equality at  0 λ = . Thus, integration in 
this case is always welfare reducing. However,  (1) (0) (0) UUi π ππ >+  only for  0.697 λ > . 
This means that even if U could purchase a downstream firm at its non-integrated profit 
level, it may not be worthwhile as integration only raises bilateral surplus when U’s 
bargaining power is sufficiently high.  
Turning to the convex cost case, it is straightforward to demonstrate that 




β λ + > . This is not surprising as otherwise the independent 
firms’ output would be reduced by integration. Figure 1 depicts the ranges of (, ) λ β  over 
which integration is bilaterally profitable and socially desirable (where the  0 β =  vertices 
corresponds to the constant marginal cost case).
13 Thus, for intermediate levels of U’s 
bargaining power, integration is not bilaterally profitable. However, as β gets larger, the 





                                                
. Thus, when 
costs are convex, integration will not be bilaterally profitable unless λ is sufficiently low 
(where there is a strong bargaining effect from integration; something not present in the 
constant marginal cost case). Moreover, in this situation, integration will result in lower 
industry output and tend to involve foreclosure on the independent downstream firm. 
Nonetheless, as costs become increasing convex, vertical integration will only occur if it 
is socially desirable. 
 
 
13 In fact, the range where integration is profitable is where: 
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Figure 1: Profitability and Social Desirability of Vertical Integration 
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These considerations carry over to the many firm case but involve an additional 
negative impact on bilateral surplus that comes from the horizontal integration impact of 
vertical integration. As demonstrated by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), horizontal 
mergers between Cournot competitors may be unprofitable when the main beneficiaries 
of the merger are outside rivals. Here, if vertical integration involves more than one 
downstream unit, a similar effect occurs. Those units’ pricing are now coordinated and in 
equilibrium will, ceteris paribus, lead to a reduction in their market share and earnings. 
For integration to be profitable, the impact on external revenue will have to outweigh any 
losses associated with horizontal integration.  
5. Other  Considerations 
This section considers various extensions of the baseline model to demonstrate 
the robustness of the qualitative results above.   17
Bertrand Price Competition 
Consider a situation where price is the strategic variable in Stage 1; that is, 
downstream firms are Bertrand competitors. In this case, if there is sufficient product 
differentiation so that an equilibrium exists where each downstream firm has positive 
orders with price chosen above upstream marginal cost, the outcome is similar to that in 
Proposition 2. That is: 
Proposition 4. Let   where:  1 ˆˆ {}
N
ii P = ≡ P
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ a r g m a x () (() , () )
i iP i i i i PP x C x x − ∈− PP ˆ P
P
 for all i. 
If   for all i, and  , then in any subgame perfect 
equilibrium, where retailer i chooses P
ˆ () 0 i x > P ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ () ( {() } ) ii i iPx C x ≥ ∑ P
i in Stage 1, realised orders are  .  1 ˆ {() }
N
ii x = P
 
The key condition here is that despite price competition, there is an interior solution 
where all retailers take positive orders in equilibrium. 
Of course, whenever final goods are close enough substitutes an interior Bertrand 
equilibrium may not exist. In the perfect substitutes case, some downstream firms may 
realise no orders in equilibrium and this will, in turn, impact upon ex post bargaining 
over procurement. To assist in analysing this case, it is supposed here that when two or 
more downstream firms choose the same lowest price, then each has an equal chance in 
providing all of the orders; that is, these are not shared. This assumption means that some 
indeterminacy that arises with Bertrand competition under convex costs will be avoided. 
For the homogenous goods case, let  ( ) ( ) i i X Px = P ∑  denote the aggregate 
demand function. The following proposition characterises the resulting equilibrium.  
Proposition 5. Suppose that downstream products are homogenous and upstream costs 
are strictly convex. Then, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, only one retailer receives 
orders where: 
{ } ˆ () ( )( ) ( ( ) , 0 P P P dyP d XP CyP ∈+ − =  )  and  . 
1 ˆˆ ˆ () m i n [() , ( ) ] yP XP C P d
− ′ =+
 
The intuition behind this result is very simple. Downstream firms will bid the price down 
as far as possible in order serve the entire market; indeed, they will bid the price down to 
a point where they expect to earn zero profits. Notice that if there are convex upstream 
costs, this will involve a price less than marginal cost and could also involve a situation 
where some orders are not fulfilled (for d sufficiently low). Finally, given that a   18
downstream firm with orders will share any remaining surplus with U, in bidding their 
profits to zero, the downstream firm necessarily dissipates any industry rents (or quasi-
rents). Thus, there are always some orders unfulfilled and the damage payments 
associated with this balance any industry profits from orders that are fulfilled. 
There are several important things to note about this equilibrium. First, notice that 
a pure strategy equilibrium exists even when upstream costs are convex. This is in 
contrast to the usual analyses of Bertrand competition in that case: where there is 
typically a mixed strategy equilibrium involving price above marginal cost. A key feature 
of the model that drives uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome is that d > 0. If d = 0, 
then the equilibrium existence problems that occur for Bertrand competition between 
firms with convex costs re-emerge (Vives, 1999).  
Second, Stahl (1988) found that when upstream supply was perfectly competitive 
(arising from price taking firms with an upward sloping supply curve), that when orders 
proceeded procurement, there existed a subgame perfect equilibrium where final good 
price equaled industry marginal cost. Stahl confined attention to the case where d was so 
high that downstream firms found it optimal never to default on orders. However, more 
critically, he assumed that procurement entailed the same price for each unit supplied. 
Thus, a retailer setting a price below upstream marginal cost was sure to make a loss; 
driving his Walrasian equilibrium outcome.  
Here, a Walrasian equilibrium does not exist when upstream costs are convex. 
This is because, in contrast to Stahl (1988), bargaining does not constrain the per unit 
input price paid to equal upstream marginal cost.
14 Even when downstream firms have all 
of the bargaining power (i.e., λ = 0), they may find it optimal to price below upstream 
marginal cost – incurring losses on marginal units or damages for unfulfilled orders. In 
this case, the equilibrium is socially inefficient involving over-production relative to the 
Walrasian case.
15
                                                 
14 Another difference between the model here and that of Stahl (1988) is the need for and sensitivity to tie 
breaking rules. While Stahl investigates alternate rules, here no such rule is needed as ex post bargaining 
drives outcomes towards a single retailer. 
15 The ability to effectively price discriminate in procurement is the key factor driving the non-Walrasian 
outcome. Even if there were more than one upstream firm, if the procurement price allowed inframarginal 
payments below upstream marginal cost, the same qualitative outcomes would result.    19
Moreover, it could also be the case that consumer surplus is lower than might be 
achieved in an integrated monopoly. Whether this is so depends upon the rationing rule 
for consumers as to who receives orders and who does not. In particular, it is possible to 
imagine an equilibrium with d arbitrarily small whereby all orders are received by a 
retailer with a very low price but very few consumers are actually served. In this 
situation, consumer surplus generated in the industry is low so that consumers as a whole 
would be better off with a downstream monopoly. However, this type of equilibrium 
relies on the lack of sophistication of consumers who willingly accept the lowest price 
offer without thinking further about what they might receive. An extension of the model 
to the case of sophisticated consumers is left for future work.  
Finally, it is worth considering the effect of vertical integration in the Bertrand 
environment. When an interior equilibrium exists, then we cannot say whether there is a 
change towards internal versus external supply following integration. Nonetheless, prices 
of all downstream firms rise as the integrated firm softens price competition. In the 
homogenous goods case, an anti-competitive effect relies on there being only one 
independent downstream firm. This is because downstream competition cannot be 
softened in that case if there are two independent firms. In that case, the integrated 
downstream firm is completely foreclosed in the downstream market. 
Exclusive Dealing 
In the standard vertical contracting literature, exclusive dealing is seen as a way in 
which upstream monopolists can restore monopolistic outcomes downstream. Here, an 
exclusive deal would be a contract signed with a retailer that prevents U from dealing 
with other downstream firms. On the face of it, such a contract would allow a single firm 
to generate orders at the monopoly price, if it excludes other firms from generating orders 
(as it may if downstream firms believed those orders would not be fulfilled). However, 
would exclusivity prevent other downstream firms from competing for orders? It won’t if 
those firms can still procure the necessary inputs to fill those orders. 
To consider this, suppose that an exclusivity deal is signed but that some other 
firms succeed in generating orders. U and its exclusive partner could choose to enforce 
their agreement and leave those orders unfilled. To do so, however, would involve   20
missing a surplus creating opportunity. As Segal and Whinston (2000) note (when that 
opportunity is created by new entry), there exist many multilateral bargaining outcomes 
(between the downstream firm, U and its exclusive partner) that would allow the 
additional surplus to be split three ways ex post.
16 Moreover, whether an order was filled 
or not would be driven by the same efficiency criteria as in Proposition 1; that is, if the 
order price above upstream marginal cost.  
Thus, it is easy to see that a downstream firm who generates an order ex ante will 
be able to receive a share of the surplus created by that order ex post. Under multilateral 
bargaining outcomes such as the Shapley value, independent retailers will receive a one 
third share of this value and hence, will compete to maximise it in Stage 1 competition. 
Thus, the equilibrium outcome of Proposition 2 will remain. Nonetheless, an exclusive 
deal will still be advantageous for U and the downstream firm concerned as it allows 
them jointly to appropriate more rents in ex post bargaining over procurement.
17 
Exclusive dealing, in contrast to vertical integration, does not actually change the nature 
of competition for orders and hence, has no anti-competitive effect.  
5.   Conclusions 
The contribution of this paper has been to stand the usual approach to vertical 
contracting on its head and consider competition for orders as taking place prior to 
procurement negotiations. This change would apply most naturally in environments 
where input supply terms can be changed or renegotiated more frequently than customer 
orders (for instance, where customers are relatively patient or goods are relatively durable 
so that downstream firms do need to have secure supply terms in place before competing 
for them). This change not only captures reality in some vertical markets but also 
                                                 
16 See also Aghion and Tirole (1987) and Spier and Whinston (1995). 
17 This pure bargaining effect from exclusivity has been noted by Segal and Whinston (2000) and Segal 
(2003). If there are some stipulated damages then these would be irrelevant in ex post negotiations except 
in terms of ensuring that U and independent downstream firm did not break off and reach a bilateral 
agreement and pay the stimulated damages. Thus, exclusivity would work in a similar way to contingent 
agreements as analysed above. In either case, appropriation of rents is all that is achieved by exclusive 
dealing.   21
generates sharp and robust predictions regarding the ability of monopolists in a vertical 
chain to leverage their market power in downstream markets. 
Significantly, in an otherwise Chicago School environment – with none of the 
usually considered impediments to procurement negotiations – contractual externalities 
or restricted pricing options – it is demonstrated that the strength of downstream 
competition constrains the ability of bottleneck monopolists to generate monopoly levels 
of final good prices. This, in turn, provides a motivation for vertical integration for purely 
strategic reasons. However, when it comes to anti-competitive effect, that vertical 
integration is used, not to foreclose on independent firms, but to weaken the competitive 
impetus coming from integrated downstream units. Thus, this is a distinct effect from 
vertical integration that stands in contrast to those arising from the standard vertical 
contracting literature. 
The fact that reversing the timing of competition for orders and procurement 
negotiations can generate such different results in otherwise identical environments 
suggests the importance of future research into the determinants of the timing of 
wholesale and output market contracts. These are likely to be related to issues of 
uncertainty, flexibility and the relative ability to re-negotiate supply contracts based on 
the realisation of orders in downstream markets. The standard literature assumes that no 
renegotiation is possible while here it has been assumed that no ex ante contractual 
commitment can be made. In most industries, the actual situation probably lies 
somewhere in between and is related to more fundamental conditions in the contracting 
environment.
18
                                                 
18 As an example of a possible path by which more fundamental conditions on contract timing may be 
explored, the model of Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1996) where downstream firms must procure 
upstream inputs prior to the resolution of demand uncertainty appears to provide a useful starting point. 
That paper identifies inventory management as a key issue in driving the profitability of vertical restraints 
(such as resale price maintenance) as a means of leveraging monopoly power. Inventory management 
combined with demand uncertainty and other rebate measures are good candidates for more fundamental 
drivers of contract timing.   22
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, I will demonstrate that given condition (i), all orders will be fulfilled. To see 
this, suppose that  j j yx =  for all  ji ≠ . Then (1) becomes:  
() ( ) ( )
1
(,) m a x m i n [,] m a x [ , 0 ] (, ) ( 0 , )
ii yp i i i i i i i i i j j i i j j i ji ji Py x p y dx y p y p x C y x p x C x
λ
λ −
−− ≠≠ −− − + − − − ∑∑ 
Now suppose that  . In this case, the chosen levels of ( i yx < i , ) ii p y  must satisfy the 
following first order conditions (the first with respect to   and the second with respect to  i y
i p ). 
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Together these imply that: 
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But since  , and C(.) is strictly convex for  , this cannot hold with equality. 
Instead, 






∂ +>  for all  i yx i < , implying that, given condition (i), the objective 
function in (1) is increasing in   over the relevant domain. Thus, the solution to (1) will 




Given this, we can set  i yx i =  for all i. The first order condition becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ,) ( 0 ,) ii i i i i i i Pp x p x C x x C x λλ −− −= − − −  
Solving for  ii p x  gives the condition in the proposition. 
 
Proof of Propositions 2 and 4 
Assume that the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. Then, firm i expects to receive: 
( ) ( ,) ( ,) ( 1)( ,) ( 0 ,) ii ii ii ii i i i Pxx x Pxx x Cxx C x λλ −− − −− −− −  
if it generates xi  orders. It chooses xi to maximise this holding x-i constant. If all 
downstream firms do the same, this gives  ˆi x  as defined in the proposition. Note that this 
implies that: 




ii i ii i i x Pxx Cxx x
− ∂
−− ∂ −= −>  (confirming the condition of 
Proposition 1).  
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The proof of Proposition 4 proceeds along the same lines with the interiority of 
the equilibrium ensuring the relevant condition of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
A non-integrated firm, i, has the same first order condition as in the non-
integrated case: 
  ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ (( ) , , ) (( ) , , ) (( ) , , ) i i ii i i ii i i ii P x Ixzx P x Ixz Cx Ixz −− −− −− ˆ + =  (5) 
while for a given integrated unit, U chooses  j z  that satisfies: 
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Evaluating (6) at   and  ˆˆ () ( 0 ) ii xI x = ˆ ˆ () ( 0 ) jj zI x = , it is easy to see that if 
ˆ ˆ (( ) ) 0 ij i j pzIx z ∂∂ < , then the RHS is less that the LHS so that, if  , then 
 (as quantity choices are strategic substitutes). Evaluating (5) where 
 but  , implies that the RHS is greater than the LHS, so that 
. This gives (i) and (ii). It is easy to see that (iii) is equivalent to 
ˆˆ () ( 0 ) ii xI x >
ˆ ˆ () ( 0 ) jj zI x <
ˆˆ () ( 0 ) ii xI x = ˆ ˆ () ( 0 ) jj zI x <
ˆˆ () ( 0 ) ii xI x >
ˆ ˆ () () ii IzI I xI <  which holds given (i) and (ii). 
 
Summing up (5) and (6), and using symmetry, we have: 
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If we evaluate (7) at   and  ˆˆ () ( 0 ) ii xI x = ˆ ˆ () ( 0 ) jj zI x =  it is easy to see that if 
ˆ ˆ E[ ( ( )) ] 0 ij i j pzIx z ∂∂ <  then aggregate equilibrium output under integration must be 
lower than that under non-integration. 
 
Finally, note that because  ˆ (.) ( ) 0 ij Pz I < , a necessary condition for the inequalities 
(i) to (iv) not to hold is that  ˆ ˆ E[ ( ( )) ] 0 ij i j pzIx z ∂∂ > . 
Proof of Proposition 5 
The proof proceeds in two parts. First, consider the outcomes of stage 2 
bargaining when there is a single downstream firm with positive orders (as will occur if 
two or more firms set the lowest downstream price) and where  ( ,0) ii i PdC x + < . So long 
as  , both of these yield:  ˆˆ ()( , 0 ) iii Pd yC y d x +− ≥ i { } ˆ (, 0 ) ii i i i yy P d C y ∈+ =   and, in 
expectation,  .  () ˆˆ E[ ] ( ) (1 ) ( ,0) ii i i i i py P d y d x C y λλ =+ − + − ˆ  24
 
Consider an equilibrium where all downstream firms set a price equal to   as in 
the proposition. By assumption, only one firm receives positive orders, that is 
ˆ P
ˆ () X P . 
Given that downstream products are homogenous, a firm setting price at   cannot raise 
price because this would not raise profits (above zero) and it cannot lower price because 
this will result in a loss. For other firms, if they raise their price, they continue to receive 
no orders (so this is not profitable). At the conjectured equilibrium, if i were to set a 
price,  , it would receive all of the orders but necessarily make a loss.  
ˆ P
ˆ
i PP <  25
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